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DEREGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
THE INDONESIAN B.EFORK PB.OGRAM
by
Scott W. Fausti and Rony Bishry

ABSTRACT

Beginning in the early 1980s, Indonesia embarked on the most comprehensive
trade liberalization program in its history.

The long-term goal of the reform

program is to replace Indonesia's industrial development strategy of import
substitution industrialization with one of export oriented industrial growth.
The issues to be discussed in this paper are: 1) the historical context from
which the current liberalization program evolved, 2) the recent reform measures
implemented by the Indonesian government, 3) the pattern of liberalization with
respect to the sequencing and speed of reforms, and 4) the successes and failures
of the new trade regime.

DEB..EG'CJLA.TION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
TBE INDONESIAN :UP'ORK PB.OGB.All
I. Introduction
To appreciate the present initiative of the Indonesian government to
deregulate and liberalize the Indonesian economy, one should consider the present
efforts at reform within an historical context.

Since independence, the

Indonesian economy has gone through five distinct phases, roughly delineated by
the years 1950-57, 1958-65, 1966-71, 1972-1982, and 1983 to the present. 1 The
first two phases spanned a period of rising nationalist sentiment against foreign
This nationalistic fervor helped advance a government policy of

influence.

import substitution and self sufficiency.

During this period the Indonesian

government, for the most part, followed an inward looking development strategy
which relied on government intervention in the private sector and state
enterprises.

Industrial development was promoted at the expense of agriculture

and the economic development programs implemented by the government had little
success.

Consequently, the economy stagnated while fiscal and monetary policy

mismanagement pushed the inflation rate into triple digits.
In September of 1965, a new government came to power as a result of a
failed coup.

In 1966, a program of macro economic stabilization and trade

liberalization was instituted. The liberalization program focused on stimulating
private sector investment and de-emphasized government investment initiatives.
Passage of the Foreign Investment Law (1967) and the Domestic Investment Law
(1968) created a package of fiscal and tariff incentives that spurred new
investment in the private sector.

In 1969, the Indo Rupiah was made fully

See Pitt (1981) for a detailed discussion of the first four
phases.
1

convertible.

In August 1971, Indonesia pegged its exchange rate to the U. S.

dollar and eliminated virtually all government restrictions on capital movements.
In November of 1978, the Indonesian government ended the rupiah-dollar link in
favor of a managed float exchange rate policy.
These reforms helped to increase average annual real GDP growth from 1. 7%
in the 1960-66 period to 7. 6% in the 1967-73 period, while reducing the rate of
inflation from 85% in 1968 to 6. 4% in 1972. 2 However, the government continued
its policy of import substitution, favoring the import competing sector over the
export sector.

Evidence of disproportional protection during this period is

provided by Pitt (1981) . 3 Pitt calculated the 1971 average effective protection
rates (ERP) and found that Indonesia's import competing sector ERP to be 66% and
the export sector ERP to be -11%. 4
The 1972-82 era was marked by raising protectionist barriers.
complicated system of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTB) evolved.

A

These NTB

included an import licensing system, quotas, import bans, and various informal
quantitative restrictions.

Informal quantitative restrictions took the form of

complex port and customs clearance procedures.

It is the general conclusion of

economists that this strategy was counter productive; fostering a number of high

2Data

on and discussion of Indonesian macro economic
performance during this period can be found on Booth (1992) and
Warr (1992).
3

See Pitt (1981), p. 208.

4The

effective rate of protection is the percentage increase
It
in value added resulting from the assistance structure.
therefore measures net assistance by taking into account input
assistance (e.g. subsidies) and input penalties (e.g. tariffs) on
the activities inputs.
2

cost, inefficient industries at the expense of more efficient labor intensive
final product industries and reduced non-oil exports. 5
The problems that usually accompany this type of trade regime, such as a
balance of payment deficit and/or government budget deficit were alleviated by
the rapid increase in world oil prices during this period.

During the 1972-82

period, Indonesia became increasingly dependent on oil exports for tax revenues.
In 1969 80% of tax revenue was derived from non-oil sources; by 1981, the
proportion had declined to 27%. 6

'When world demand for oil decreased in the

early 1980s, the price of oil collapsed.

The decline in export tax revenue led

to a widening trade and budget deficit for Indonesia.

Faced with financial

crisis, the government retreated further from the gains attained through trade
liberalization (1966�71) and began to restrict imports.

It was during this

period, however, that deregulation of the financial sector of the economy began. 9
In 1983, the rupiah was devalued, and in 1984 tax reform laws were passed.
As import restrictions tightened, a debate arose over the wisdom of
continuing

to support

an

import

substitution

industrialization

policy. 7

Economists argued that the potential gains from this policy had been exhausted
and it was time to begin the transition to an export oriented trade regime and
emulate the success of the other Pacific Rim nations.
In 1985 it had finally become clear to Indonesian government officials that
the inward looking bias of their trade regime had created a high cost economy
vulnerable to macro economic instability driven by fluctuations in world oil

A aore detailed discussion can
World Bank (1988b), pp. 56-58.
5

Asher and Booth (1992), p. 49.

be

found in a study by the

6

7 For

a detailed discussion of deregulation of the financial
sector in Indonesia during this period see Cole and Slade (1992).
3

prices. 8

The resulting economic instability impaired the government's ability

to meet its general economic goals of promoting 1)

economic growth,

2)

employment, 3) income, and 4) greater equity in income distribution.
II.

Deregulation and Trade Liberalization: Indonesia in the 1980a
The most extensive trade liberalization program in Indonesian history was

initiated in March of 1985.

The long-term goal of the reform program was to

reverse Indonesian industrial development strategy from import substitution
industrialization to export oriented industrial growth.

Between March of 1985

and May of 1990, 22 major reform measures were implemented to liberalize
Indonesia's trade regime and further deregulate the financial and real
A brief outline of the major reform

(production) sectors of the economy. 9
measures is given below.

In March of 1985, the government began a comprehensive reform of the tariff
schedule. 10

The tariff ceiling was reduced from 225% to 60% and the number of

tariff categories was reduced from 25 to 11.

The reforms reduced the proportion

of imports subject to tariff rates greater than 30% from 41% to 18%.

However,

the effectiveness of this reform was partially offset by the increased use of
import licensing restrictions.
In April of 1985, the government completely reorganized the customs, ports,
and shipping operation procedures in order to remove informal quantitative

A detailed discussion of the debate can be found in the paper
by M. Hadi Soesastro (1989).
8

For a discussion of the impact world oil price instability
had on the Indonesian economy during the 1970s and 1980s, see Warr
(1992).
9

complete description of the reform measures can be found
in GATT's Trade Policy Review: Indonesia 1991, Vol I.
10A

4

restrictions to trade.11

In May of 1986, the government implemented reform

measures to reduce the use of import licensing restrictions. In January of 1987,
the government instituted adjustments in tariffs and surcharges to compensate
domestic producers for the removal of import licensing restrictions. In December
of 1987, the government removed or simplified the regulations directly affecting
exporters. In October of 1988, further deregulation of the financial sector was
implemented with a sweeping reform of the banking system.
government replaced NTB on 301 items with tariffs.

In November, the

In December,

private

securities markets were established. In January of 1989, the Harmonized System
of Trade Classification replaced the CCCN system.

In May of 1990, 374 NTB were

abolished and tariffs on 2363 items were lowered.12

Indonesia has made great

progress in both restructuring its economy and fulfilling its commitments to GATT
and ASEAN through its liberalization program.

Before October 1986, 32% of all

import items, representing 41% of total domestic production, were subject to
import

licensing

restrictions.

By

December

of

1990,

import

licensing

restrictions were reduced to 14% of all items imported; representing 25% of total
domestic production (see table I).
The reduction in NTB restrictions allows tariffs to play the major role in
determining the level and pattern of imports. Tariff rates in 1990 are applied
on an "most favored nation" (m.f.n.) basis to over 90% of the total value of
Indonesian imports. The average m.f.n. tariff rate in 1990 has been lowered to
22% (simple average), down from 37% in 1984 (see tables II & 111). 13

World Bank (1988b), p. 58.

11

World Bank (1988b), p. 59.

12
13

GATT (1991) Vol. I, pp. 244-48.
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Table I. Percan.tage Cov8ragre of Iaport L:l.censiJJg Restrietians in Indcllesia,
1986-90

CCCN/HS itema
IIP)rt valU81S

Dolle8tic product.ia'l
- mm.afacturing
- agriculture
- m.n:1ng am a1nera1a
Source:

Kid-1986

ll»-1987

ll»-1988

Barly-1990

B!»-1990

32

22

16

fl

17

1,

25

21

41

17

38

29

15

,s

28
38

25
33
38
0

68
5'

58
0

can Trade Polley Review 1991:

Table 11.

na

"°

41
0

53

0

0

Indonesia, Vol. I, p. 86.

scructu.re of the lnclonedan Tariff Since 1983
1983·15

Average r.riff llatea (per cent)•
U..ipc.4
lletpce4
• hy dollllatic production'
• by illport value
Index of 41aper•lon (percentage
points)

•

1985•

1988..

1989•

199()11

24.0

27.0

22.2

37.3

27.0

29.0
22.0

u.o

14.S

u.o

19.0
12.0

16.1
10.0

61.5

107.1

90.0

92.7

89.0

19.0

Following the refon pac.kage of larch 1915 •
Following the r:efora ,.ck.age of Rovellber 1911,
c the HI incrocluced on 1 January 1919.
Folloviq the nfora package of Bay 1990.
e Including hlporcant 1urcbar1•• where applica'ble.
f aa..d 011 a •aple of 1.200 tariff podeiou.
SCNrca:

CA'rT Trade Policy Review 1991:

6

lndonada. Vol. I, p. 62.

Table Ill. Structure of Import Du.ty Tariff l1fore and After Nay 1990
lafora
I11porc duty carlff
0
15
2S
3S
45

•
•
..
•
•
>

Total m••t pf ta[lff tttv
Before Kay '90

Afcer Nay '90

2956
1036
1431

2901
1116

10
20
30
40
60
60

447

1505
103

Tocal

7431

1706
88

74

7176

Source: CATT Trade Policy l1vi1v 1991: Indone1la, Vol. II, p. 2S.

III, Trade Liberalization: The Sequencing and Speed of Reform.
Deregulation and liberalization of the Indonesian economy has followed a
long-run, piecemeal process.

Economic reform emerged as a byproduct of the

political reform that followed the failed 1965 coup.

The first permanent major

reform in the process was the liberalization of the capital account in 1971.
Attempts during this period to permanently liberalize the current account however
failed. The next major economic reform program did not begin until 1982, sparked
by the onset of the oil crisis which fueled public concern over the future of the
economy. These reform measures focused on the financial sector of the Indonesian
economy. It is the general consensus that this round of reforms was begun in the
financial sector because the political opposition to reform was weakest in this
area.

After financial sector reforms were implemented, it became clear that
7

reform effort would be futile if deregulation of the real (production) sector of
the economy did not follow. 14
sector began.

In 1985, reform and deregulation of the real

In 1986, liberalization of the current account began.

The effect

was encouraging, as non-oil exports expanded rapidly, sending a signal that the
economy responded favorably to the reform measures.
The success of the reform measures allowed the proponents of change to gain
greater influence over economic policy when the 5th Development Cabinet took
office in March of 1988.

The new cabinet promptly began another round of reform

measures focusing first on the financial sector of the economy.

The government

first deregulated the banking system in October of 1988, and then allowed the
establishment of private securities markets in December of 1988. Government
officials, following the successful pattern of reform set in the mid 1980's, then
implemented additional reforms in the real and international sectors of the
economy.
In conclusion, the lessons learned from Indonesia's experience with
economic

reform

suggests

a

gradual

approach

to

deregulation

and

liberalization, focusing on liberalizing the capital account first.

trade
Next,

reforms in the financial, production and international sectors of the economy,
should commence in the sector which has the greatest ability to adjust in the
shortest period of time.
stress on the economy.

Deregulation should proceed in steps to avoid excess

In the Indonesian case, reform is an ongoing process that

has evolved over the last ten years.

14

GATT (1991), Vol I, p. 4.
8

IV.

The Economic Im.pact of Deregulation and Trade Liberalization on the
Indonesian Economy
The value (in constant US dollars) of Indonesia's non-oil exports doubled

in the 1985-89 period.

Non-oil export growth was led by the industrial sector,

which has experienced an annual growth rate trend of 34. 4%.

This explosion in

non-oil exports has increased the share of non-oil exports in the total value of
exports from 31% to 61% (see table IV).

The importance of the timing of the

reforms becomes evident when one realizes that the non-oil export boom has offset
the steep decline in the value of oil and gas exports. Without the reforms, the
average annual real GDP growth rate of 5. 7% experienced in the 1986-89 period
would have been reduced and probably would have been closer to the 1. 4% growth
rate experienced in 1975-84 period.is

15For

a discussion of this issue see Soesastro (1989).
9
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1989 was still biased in favor of import competing non-oil manufacturing.

As a

percentage of value, NTB protection allotted to the non-oil export and import
competing manufacturing in 1989 was 12. 78% and 38. 06% respectively (see table V) .
Average ERP for the non-oil manufacturing sector also continues to be high
relative to the other sectors of the economy.

However, average ERP has declined

from 73.2% in 1987 to 63. 6% in 1989 to 60% in 1990.

The ERP rate for the import

competing sector declined from 66% in 1971 to 44. 4% in 1989.
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For the export
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sector, the ERP rate increased from -llX in 1971 to -6. 4X in 1989. 16

For all

tradeable goods, the ERP rate declined from 33% in 1971, to 15% in 1989, and to
12X in 1990 (see table VI) .
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Indonesian ERP rat.es in table VI reveal that protection is not evenly
applied across all sectors of the economy.

The disparity in ERP rates among

sectors has decreased, however, under the new trade regime.

Nevertheless, the

current level of disparity is sufficient to distort the allocation of productive
resources within and between sectors.

The non-oil manufacturing sector remains

protected at the expense of the agricultural sector, and the exporting sector is
penalized in favor of the import competing sector.

Despite the continued

commercial policy distortions, the Indonesian government has placed the economy
on a non-oil export industrial growth path based firmly on the fundamental
principle of free trade.

However, the real sector distortion resulting from

errant policy prescription, represents a serious impediment to the government's
policy objective of improving Indonesia's international competitiveness. 17
V. Summary
Deregulation and trade liberalization in the 1980s have enabled the
replacement of the import substitution development strategy with one of export
led growth.

Indonesia's new trade regime has spurred export growth in all

sectors of the economy and assisted in increasing the average annual real GDP
growth rate above the depressed 1975-84 average.

Commercial policy distortions

continue under the new trade regime, but they are gradually being reduced.

The

greatest progress has been in the area of tarrification.
The resurgence of the Indonesian economy suggests that the recent reforms
are working. However, the domestic production distortions produced by uneven ERP
between and within sectors of the Indonesian economy will retard progress toward
international competitiveness by impairing efficient resource allocation within
and between sectors of the economy.
17A

The success of the current reforms suggests

negative ERP implies production is in effect being taxed.
12

that it is vital to Indonesia's long-run economic goals that deregulation
continues in the real sector of the economy.

13
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